Proposals for federal control of foreign banks by Robert Johnston
NOTE TO LIBRARIES
The following changes should be noted in title and frequency ofpublication:
Monthly Review-monthlythrough December 1972
Business Review-bimonthly all of 1973, quarterly 1974 through
1975
Economic Review-(name change only), quarterly beginning
December 1975
The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's Economic Review is published quarterly
by the Bank's Research and Public Information Department under the supervision of
Michael W. Keran, Vice President. The publication is edited by William Burke, with the
assistance of Karen Rusk (editorial) and Janis Wilson (graphics). Subscribers to the
Economic Review may also be interested in receiving this Bank's Publications List or
weekly Business and Financial Letter. For copies of these and other Federal Reserve
publications, contact the Public Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, California 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184.
2Robert Johnston
Foreign banks have operated in the United
States for over a hundred years, but they have
begun to attract attention only recently, primar-
ily as the result of the rapid expansion of their
activities in the nation's major financial centers.
In the past few years, foreign banks have be-
come an important part of the national bank-
ing scene, and yet this growth has taken place
under rules laid down by state law, not Federal
law. The entry of foreign banks into specific
markets has been determined primarily by the
laws of the various states, so that foreign banks
have been able to escape almost entirely from
Federalbankingcontrol. Consequently, a series
of Congressional proposals have been made to
bring foreign-bank operations under effective
Federalcontrol.
Growth of Foreign Banks
Until the late 1960's, most foreign banks were
located in New York City, being attracted there
by the advantages of direct access to the New
York money market and by the ability to offer
New York facilities to their international cus-
tomers. Apart from New York, California was
the only state at that time with any significant
number of foreign banks. Most of California's
foreign banks specialized in serving interna-
tional and business customers, but some differed
from their New York counterparts by gradually
building up a retail banking network.
The foreign-bank sector expanded rapidly in
the early 1970's, in terms of both numbers and
operatingvolume. The number of U.S. banking
institutions owned by foreign banks rose from
85 to 104 between 1965 and 1972, and then ac-
celerated to reach 181 by September 1975. This
growth was fostered by their ability to establish
an interstate banking network in a form denied
to U.S. domestic banks. Because of legal orga-
nizations open to them under various state laws,
foreign banks can establish banking offices
across state lines (see appendix). In contrast,
their domestic competitors are limited to their
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home states, except for international banking
subsidiaries operating as Edge Act Corpora-
tions. Foreign banks can open branches or
agencies in as many states as will license them.
These branches and agencies are not separately
incorporated but are legally offices of the for-
eign banks, so thatthe usual prohibitions against
interstate branching or acquisitions do not ap-
ply, as they would to domestic banks.
Many foreign banks come under the Bank
Holding Company Act (BHC Act), but this
Federalstatute affects only those controlling do-
mestically-chartered banks. A foreign bank
controlling a banking subsidiary - that is, a
commercial bank with a state (or more rarely)
national charter-must register as a bank hold-
ing company, and as such it is prohibited from
making interstate acquisition of additional
banks. But branches and agencies are not
"banks" for purposes of this Act, which means
that these holding companies can expand
across state lines through new branches or
agencies. Moreover, a foreign bankthat limits
its U.S. banking operations to branches or
agencies is not subject to Federal banking laws,and it can also engage in nonbanking activities
closed to U.S. banks and to those foreign banks
which do come under the BRe Act.
Only ten states explicitly permit some kind
of foreign banking, but this group of ten in-
cludes New York, California, and since 1973,
Illinois. The ability to operate in the nation's
three largest financial markets gives foreign
banks a useful advantage over their domestic
competitors. Currently, 44 foreign banking or-
ganizations have offices in at least two states,
and 20 of them operate in three or more states.
The growth of these interstate banking opera-
tions - a privilege denied domestic banks
helps explain the pressure behind the proposals
for expanded Federal control.
Another reason for such pressure is the
growing importance of foreign banks in the na-
tion's credit markets, as shown in recent Con-
gressional testimony by Federal Reserve Gov-
ernor George Mitchell.' Between November
1972 and SeptembCi 1975, "standaid" banking
assets of these institutions (after adjustments
for clearing and transactions with the foreign
parent bank or its affiliates) jumped from $18
billion to $41 billion. Their commercial and
industrial loans doubled in this period from $11
billion to $23 billion, equalling one-fifth the
business-loan volume of large domestic banks.
Furthermore, three-quarters of their business
loans were made to domestic (not foreign) bor-
rowers. Yet despite these developments, total
"standard" assets of foreign banks amounted
onlyto about 5 percent of the total assets of all
u.s. banks last year.
To a large degree, the foreign banks' rapid
expansion in the U.S. reflects the worldwide
growth of international banking. Foreign
banks, in a sense, are following the U.S. banks'
example by expanding overseas. For competi-
tive reasons, foreign banks have had to follow
their domestic customers to this country, since
a major international bank must have at least
one U.S. office if it expects to match the range
of services offered by competing institutions.
With the rapid development of international
banking, foreign banks have become active in
many national banking markets besides the
U.S.-but in no other major country do na-
tional monetary and regulatory bodies have
such little control over the foreign banks oper-
ating within their boundaries. Most such opera-
tions here are not subject to Federal Reserve
System reserve requirements. Federal regula-
tory supervision is limited to subsidiary banks,
and does not extend to the more important
branches and agencies.
Further pressure for federal regulation arises
from the recognition that the U.S. government
is at a disadvantage in negotiating with foreign
governments on bebalf of U.S. banks, because
effective control of foreign banking in the
United States is in the hands of the individual
states. A Federal presence in the control of
such operations would increase the U.S. bar-
gaining power when discussing banking issues
with other governments.
Federal legislative Proposals
Legislation to modify the present situation times greater than foreign banks' assets here.
must consider domestic banking policy but also Legislation now being considered in Con-
recognize possible international consequences. gress would eliminate discrimination by fol-
New regulations for foreign banks would af- lowing a policy of uniform or national treat-
feet the pattern of domestic competition, but ment. Foreign banks would have no more
changes which limit existing rights of foreign rights than U.S. domestic banks; both would
banks could result in new restrictions against operate under the same regulatory standards.
U.S. banks operating abroad. Indeed, Amer- A policy of non-discriminatory treatment, even
ican banks and their customers would have where it has restrictive effects, is clearly easier
more to lose in any such situation; the assets to justify to foreign governments and less likely
of U.S. banks abroad ($135 billion) are three to result in retaliation.
33The treatment of existing but nonconforming
activities always presents a policy question,
with several different legislative answers. Ex-
isting activities could be forced to conform
fully to new regulations, but on the other hand,
banking legislation commonly exempts or
"grandfathers" existing operations, applying the
new law only to operations begun after a spe-
cified date. A good example is the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act. Each interstate bank hold-
ing company existing when the Act became ef-
fective in 1956 was allowed to keep the banks
it owned outside its principal state of opera-
tions, but future acquisitions were forbidden.
In 1970, when the BHC Act was revised,
grandfather rights were given to certain non-
banking subsidiaries. In the present context,
grandfathering could be advocated because for-
eign banks originally established their opera-
tions legitimately under state statutes, and elim-
ination of these eXlstmg rights might be re-
garded as a violation of our international treaty
obligations.
Congress is now considering three separate
bills that would establish Federal regulation of
foreign banks. They all have the common aim
of achieving equality of treatment between do-
mestic banks and their foreign competitors
while establishing more effective Federal con-
trol. The first is the Federal Reserve System's
proposal, the Foreign Bank Act, originally in-
troduced in December 1974 and reintroduced
in March 1975. This bill deals only with for-
eign banking. The Financial Reform Act of
1976, while aimed generally at a general re-
form of financial institutions, contains a section
dealing specifically with foreign banks. The
third bill, the International Banking Act of
1976, in many respects resembles the Foreign
BankAct.
Control of branches and agencies
The Foreign Bank Act deals with the ques-
tion of interstate expansion by simply redefin-
ing all branches and agencies as "banks" for
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act.
Foreign parent banks not presently covered
would be regarded as bank holding companies.
All interstate expansion by way of branches or
agencies would be stopped. Since the BHC
Act forbids interstate acquisition of "banks,"
foreign banks would be limited to their existing
A. Foreign Bank Act of 1975
The Foreign Bank Act is based upon the states of operation. But within those states,
principle of nondiscrimination: foreign banks foreign banks could (with Federal Reserve per-
in the United States should have the same pow- mission) establish new branches or agencies
ers as equivalent U.S. banks but no more than and bank subsidiaries, on the same basis as
that. The bill came about as a result of Fed- domestic banks. Foreign banks entering the
eraI Reserve discussions with foreign banks, United States for the first time would be limited
foreign governments, and U.S. banking organi- to a single state-in practice, probably either
zations. Its provisions are detailed and in California or New York.
many sections very complex, but its goals are The BHC Act contains a clause allowing in-
clear-to establish equal treatment consistent terstate acquisitions if state law gives specific
with established rights of foreign banks, and permission and if the right is available to both
to achieve effective Federal control over this domestic and foreign banking organizations.
growing sector of the banking system. Only Maine to date has passed such legislation,
although enabling bills have been introduced
on occasion in both the California and New
York legislatures. Inbrief, foreign banks would
be unable to open branch offices across state
lines until such time as domestic bank holding
companies are allowed interstate acquisitions.
With all foreign banks brought under the
BHC Act, their activities in nonbanking busi-
nesses also would come under Federal regula-
tion. The BHC Act limits nonbanking activi-
ties to those approved by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors as being closely related to
34banking. Consequently, foreign banks would
have to conform to the same set of rules which
govern the nonbanking activities of domestic
bank holding companies. For some foreign
banks, particularly those involved in the securi-
ties business, this provision would cause prob-
lems, but for others it would confirm their
right to engage in approved lines of domestic
financial services.
Federal Reserve membership
Membership in the Federal Reserve System
would be compulsory for all U.S. offices of for-
eign banks whose world-wide assets are above
$500 million. This provision would bring al-
most all foreign banks under domestic mone-
tary control.
Federal branches and national banks
At present, foreign banks have little choice
except to operate under state license, whereas
under the dual banking system, domestic banks
have the choice of operating either under na-
tional or state regulations. To make dual
banking an effective option, the Foreign Bank
Act would permit up to one-third of each
national bank's directors to be foreign na-
tionals and would remove the present provi-
sion of the National Bank Act requiring U.S.
citizenship for all directors. Secondly, the
Act would establish a Federal equivalent to the
state-licensed branch, and would permit con-
version of state-licensed branches or agencies
to Federal status. Each foreign branch would
have all the privileges of a national bank, ex-
cept that its its lending limits would be based
upon the capital of its foreign parent. For
these reasons, a Federal branch clearly would
represent an important new option for foreign
banks.
FDIC insurance
FDIC insurance, currently available to bank
susidiaries of foreign banks, would be made
available to branches and agencies as well.
Actually, FDIC insurance does not appear to
b~ necessary now for most branches, which
are engaged mostly in wholesale-banking busi-
ness, but under the principle of competitive
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equality, insurance coverage for branch de-
posits should be allowed. In California, this
provision would permit agencies to assume the
equivalent of branch status; at present, Cali-
fornia law does not permit foreign agencies to
accept deposits of domestic customers, b~­
cause their deposit accounts cannot be in-
sured by the FDIC.
Federal licensing
Federal authorities would establish effective
control over the entry of new banks and the
expansion of existing offices by requiring any
foreign bank entering the United States to ap-
ply for a Federal license. Foreign banks al-
ready here would only have to register, but
licenses would be required for all future acqui-
sitions or mergers involving other banks, or
for the opening of additional branches or agen-
cies. The only exception would be de novo of-
fices of bank subsidiaries, because such offices
are not regarded as separate "banks." The
Comptroller of the Currency would issue li-
censes, after applying the usual regulatory
standards and consulting with the Federal Re-
serve, the Treasury and the Department of
State. The Secretary of the Treasury could
instruct the Comptroller not to issue a license,
if it was "not in the best interests of the United
States," whenever it appeared necessary to
block entry for foreign-policy reasons.
Grandfather rights
The Foreign Bank Act follows the prece-
dent of the BHC Act in allowing liberal grand-
father rights. In doing so, it resolves most ob-
jections to the bill expressed by foreign govern-
ments, and thus minimizes the danger of retal-
iation. The Foreign Bank Act would grand-
father all existing offices of foreign banks as
of the date the bill was first introduced (De-
cember 3, 1974). Within its principal state
of operations (measured by total assets), each
foreign bank would be allowed to expand ac-
cording to rights presently existing for domes-
tic banks under state law. In other states, it
could make no more new acquisitions, but
could maintain any existing branching rights.
In the special case of investment-bankingsubsidiaries, only existing offices would be
grandfathered and no further expansion would
be permitted. This would conform with the
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
separates commercial from investment-banking
operations-in contrast to the situation in Eu-
rope, where the two activities are commonly
combined. Because of the limited number and
size of the securities affiliates controlled by
foreign banks, grandfathering of existing of-
fices would appear to be the most acceptable
solution. Current rights would be protected,
but future expansion in violation of the inten-
tions of the Glass-Steagall Act would be ex-
pressly prohibited.
Other provisions
The Foreign Bank Act allows foreign banks,
for the first time, to establish Edge Act Corpo-
rations (see appendix). Edge Act subsidiaries
could be established in other states as well as
abroad, but U.S. offices would be limited to a
purely international banking business. Because
of the international specialization of many for-
eign banks, Edge Act subsidiaries would rep-
resent a reasonable alternative to the present
agency form of organization as a mechanism
for conducting business in other financial cen-
ters-and they would represent an alternative
already open to U.S. banks.
In its original form, the Foreign Bank Act
excluded from Federal regulation two forms
of organizations used by foreign banks to op-
erate in the United States-joint-venture banks
operated by foreign banks, with none owning
more than 25 percent of the outstanding
shares,2 and New York State-chartered invest-
ment companies which can conduct a banking
business. The exception was made because of
the very small number of these banking orga-
nizations, and because of the possible impact
on domestic nonbank corporations of chang-
ing the BHC Act definitions of control. How-
ever, a number of foreign banks have recently
applied for permission to form joint-venture
banks or New York State investment compa-
nies, subsequent to the introduction of the For-
eign BankAct. In view of the potential for eva-
sion of Federal control, the Federal Reserve
has now proposed several limiting amendments.
Future investment companies chartered in New
York to engage in commercial banking would
be subject to the same provisions applicable to
branches and agencies. As for joint ventures,
the definition of control would be changed to
cover cases where shareholders, as in consor-
tia banks, act in concert to control a domestic
bank. This restriction would apply to domestic
cases of joint control as well as to foreign
banks.
Summary
The Foreign Bank Act would bring foreign
banks in the United States under comprehen-
sive Federal control. Federal supervisory and
examination procedures would be applied to
insure that appropriate banking practices are
followed. Federal Reserve membership would
be required to insure that an important sector
of the banking industry is brought under na-
tional monetary control. Foreign banks would
lose certain privileges, principally in multi-
state banking, but generally would exercise the
same rights as domestic banks. Federal licens-
ing procedures on entry and acquisitions would
help strengthen'\the Federal governments' abil-
ity to obtain nondiscriminatory treatment for
U.S. banks operating overseas.
B. Financial Reform Act of 1976
The Financial Reform Act of 1976 is the
companion piece in the House to the Financial
Institutions Act passed by the Senate in De-
cember 1975. This legislation reflects proposals
contained in the recent Congressional study, Fi-
nancial Institutions and the Nation's Economy
(the FINEstudy), as well as the extensive hear-
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ings on that study. The FINE study was de-
signed as a general reform of the nation's finan-
cial system including activities of foreign
banks - and the subsequent legislation repre-
sents a thoroughgoing, though more limited, re-
vision of the system.
Chapter 4 of Title I of the Financial ReformAct deals with foreign banks. Although based
onTitle VI of the FINEstudy, this chapter has
been substantially revised as a result of pro-
posals made by Federal Reserve representa-
tives and others at Congressional hearings on
this subject. Chapter 4 is designed to establish
competitive equality between domestic and
foreign banks, but the treatment of foreign
banks is markedly different from that proposed
in the Foreign Bank Act.
The following provisions of Chapter 4 would
affect foreign banks' activities in this country:
Grandfather rights
There would be no permanent grandfather
rights for nonconforming banking offices and
for securities affiliates controlled by foreign
banks.
Federal licensingfor entry
The entry of foreign banks would be subject
to Federal licensing requirements. Consulta-
tion with the Treasury Department and the
Secretary of State would be required. This
provision is similar to the corresponding one
in the Foreign Bank Act, except that state-
licensed branches and agencies would not be
covered.
Treatment of branches and agencies
Federally-licensed branches would be per-
mitted, except in states which prohibit such
branches. Federal branches would maintain a
surety deposit with the FDIC sufficient to give
coverage such as that provided by FDIC insur-
ance. Interstate expansion by either state or
Federal branches would be prohibited.
National Bank Act
Foreign banks would be allowed to have
subsidiaries, under the same terms as the Na-
tional Bank Act, and up to one-third of na-
tional bank directors could be foreign nationals.
These subsidiaries wouldbe known as "interna-
tional banks." Edge Act subsidiaries would
also be permitted.
Nonbanking subsidiaries
NOllbanking subsidiaries controlled by for-
eign banks would be subject to the same rules
that are applied to domestic bank holding com-
panies under the BHC Act. This clause is the
same as in the Foreign Bank Act, except that
non-conforming affiliates would have to be
phased out within five years.
Federal Reserve membership
Federal branches and banking subsidiaries
of foreign banks would be subject to the same
reserve requirements that are applied to similar
domestic banks by the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve services and credit would be
available to these institutions. State-licensed
branches and agencies would be subject to Sys-
tem reserve requirements but would not have
access to System services.
Summary
The Financial Reform Act now being con-
sidered by the House is much closer to the For-
eign Bank Act than to the FINE study in its
foreign banking clauses. However, like the
FINE study, it excludes grandfather rights for
existing interstate banking offices. This
amounts to a strict interpretation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for all financial insti-
tutions. In the FINE Study, the impact of this
exclusion was largely offset by a liberalization
of interstate branching rights for all banks. In
contrast, the Financial Reform Act makes no
change in branching laws, so that its lack of a
grandfather clause would have a more substan-
tial impact on foreign banks. The Financial
ReformAct, like the Foreign Bank Act but not
the FINE Study, includes such provisions as
foreign directors for national banks, federal li-
censing, and FDIC coverage of branch de-
posits.
C. International Banking Act of 1976
The third bill now before Congress, the In-
ternational Banking Act of 1976, resembles
the other pieces of legislation in its basic ap-
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proach-giving foreign banks the same rights
as domestic banks while bringing their opera-
tions under Federal control.Grandfatherrights
Multi-state banking operations would be
grandfathered, except that state-licensed
branches and agencies outside the principal
state of operations would have to convert to
Federal branch status.
Federal licensingfor entry
Federal licenses would be required, and for-
eign individuals' share purchases involving con-
trol of a domestic bank would require Federal
approval.
Treatment of branches and agencies
Federal licenses for branches would be avail-
able except where state law prohibits such
branches. Interstate expansion by branches or
agencies would be allowed with state permis-
sion. As a substitute for FDIC insurance, an
equivalent surety deposit would be required.
Multi-state branches would all have to be Fed-
eral branches.
Nonbankingsubsidiaries
Nonbanking activities of foreign banks which
control subsidiary banks, branches or agencies
would be limited to those allowed under the
BHC Act. Securities affiliates could deal in
securities to the extent allowed national banks.
Federal Reserve membership
Federal Reserve membership would be re-
quired for all banking subsidiaries. Branches
and state-chartered investment companies con-
trolled by foreign banks would be subject to
System reserve requirements.
Summary
The International Banking Act is generally
similar to the Foreign Bank Act. An earlier
draft circulated in 1975 would have prohibited
foreign branches from accepting domestic de-
posits; this provision has been removed. This
bill gives the states more latitude than they
have under the Foreign Bank Act to control
multi-state branch operations. Individual states
could forbid the entry of foreign branches, but
those that wish to build up a local international
banking market could continue to do so. Multi-
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state branching would be allowed if permission
is obtained from banking authorities in both
the home state and the state which the foreign
bank wishes to enter. Such rights need not be
grantedto domestic banks, as the Foreign Bank
Act requires. All such multi-state branches
would have to operate with Federal licenses.
:r-,1ulti-state acquisitions of banking subsidiaries
would continue to be prohibited under terms
of the BHCAct.
The proposals described in this article have
the common goal of establishing effective Fed-
eral control over foreign banks operating inside
the United States. They also adopt the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination or equality of national
treatment. Nonetheless, important differences
remain despite common goals and principles.
On the issue of federal control, all adopt
with little variation the same general approach:
Federal licensing of foreign banks entering or
expanding their banking activities inside the
United States. Consultation with the Treasury
Department and State Department would be re-
quired by the appropriate licensing agency to
allow for consideration of foreign-policy goals.
Nonbank subsidiaries and affiliates would all be
brought under the Bank Holding Company Act.
Federal Reserve System reserve requirements
would be imposed for purposes of monetary
control.
The most significant difference concerns the
application of the principle of equal treatment
to nonconforming multi-state banking offices.
The strict view, as embodied in the Financial
Reform Act, would phase out foreign banks'
multi-state banking offices where domestic
banks do not have equivalent powers. The al-
ternative, followed in the other bills, would
grandfather existing banking operations but
prevent new multi-state offices.
The Federal Reserve's view is that no perma-
nent competitive advantage would accrue from
the retention of existing multi-state banking
offices, and that the past legislative precedent
for domestic bank holding companies would
support a liberal grandfather clause in this caseas well. Moreover, liberal treatmentwould min-
imize the possibility of foreign retaliation
against U.S. banks, and would be more con-
sistent with U.S. efforts to strengthen the inter-
national banking system.
The Foreign Bank Act of 1975, the Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1976 and the Financial
Reform Act of 1976 are all under considera-
tion in this session of Congress. The first two
are aimed at foreign banking within the frame-
work of existing banking laws, while the latter
treats foreign banking as part of a general re-
form of domestic financial institutions. Which-
ever approach is taken, the era of regulatory
dominance by state regulators is coming to an
end. In the process, foreign banks will lose
some privileges and gain others, but the trend
will be to national treatment under the primary
control of the Federal government.
FOOTNOTES
1. Statement by George W. Mitchell, Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Jan-
uary 28, 1976, before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, United States Senate.
2. Under the BHC Act, a corporation owning more than
25 percent of the shares of a bank was presumed to control
that bank, and the corporation was required to register as a
bank holding company. Below 25·percent and above 5·per.
cent ownership, a fo'rmal finding by the Federal Reserve
was required to establish that "control" existed.
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS
Domestic banking subsidiary-A domestic bank
with its own board of directors and capitalization.
It is called a subsidiary because a controlling inter-
est of its shares is owned by a foreign parent bank.
Theparent bank is regarded as a bank holding com-
pany and is regulated under the Bank Holding
Company Act by the Federal Reserve System. The
subsidiary bank is subject to the same regulatory
rules as its domestic bank competitors and has
access to FDIC insurance. Lending limits are de-
termined by the subsidiary bank's own capital and
surplus, not that of its parent. Federal Reserve
membership is optional if the bank is organized
under state law, and in practice most banking sub-
sidiaries are nonmembers.
Branch Office-An office of a foreign bank licensed
to do a banking business by a particular state, but
with no separate corporate charter. A branch can
make loans and accept domestic deposits. The de-
posits are subject to state reserve requirements but
these can be met partially by interest-earning as-
sets, so that the effective burden is less than that of
Federal Reserve requirements. With some limita-
tions, branches conduct a general banking business
similar to that of a domestic bank. Unlike a do-
mestically-chartered bank, the lending limit of a
foreign branch is determined by the capital of the
parent bank. Branch licenses are available in New
York and Illinois. Some branches also operate in
Oregon and Washington with deposit-accepting
powers by virtue ofgrandfather rights.
Agency office-An office which, like a branch, has
no separate corporate charter and is regarded as an
office of the parent bank. An agency, unlike a
branch, cannot accept domestic deposits but must
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raise its funds through non-deposit sources, includ-
ing funds of its parent or other commercial banks.
An agency is not subject to lending limits and to re-
serve requirements. Under New York law, foreign
banks can choose between agency and branch sta-
tus. In California, because of a state requirement
that domestic deposits have FDIC insurance, for-
eign bank offices are usually regarded as agencies
(following New York terminology), although the
state law describes them as branches. In Washing-
ton, foreign bank branches are effectively"agencies,
because only small amounts of domestic deposits
are permitted.
Representative office-An office which conducts
no direct banking business. Business is solicited on
behalf of and appears on the books of the parent
bank or its affiliates. Under California law, repre-
sentatives are licensed by the state, but in most
states they are not regulated because they are not
engaged directly in any local banking activity. Rep-
resentative offices are the most common form of
foreign banking presence in the United States.
Edge Act Corporation-A subsidiary of a member
bank formed to engage in international banking,
through foreign and domestic offices. The domestic
offices may be located in states outside that of the
parent bank. Edge Act operations in the United
States are limited to international banking and ac-
ceptance of domestic deposits arising from interna-
tional transactions. Lending limits are set by the
capital of the subsidiary, not the parent bank. Edge
Act corporations allow domestic banks to operate
multi-state offices for international banking pur-
poses, and they are similar to foreign agencies.